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Federal Cable Act
(continued from page 129)
service is not limited to cable pro-
gramming, the Cable Act preempt-
ed only laws regarding the provi-
sion of cable services, not all cable
services generally.
Judy Koehler
Eighth Circuit Imposes Full
CERCLA Liability On Seller
Who Hid Contamination
From Purchaser
In Gopher Oil Company, Inc. v.
Union Oil Company of California,
955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1992), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that the
seller of a chemical plant site was
100 percent responsible for the
environmental cleanup costs in-
curred by the purchaser because
the seller caused the pollution and
misrepresented the condition of
the site when selling the property.
Background
A subsidiary of Union Oil Com-
pany of California ("Union") oper-
ated a petroleum product treat-
ment facility on a five-acre site in
Minneapolis, Minnesota from the
early 1960's until 1980. The sub-
sidiary's normal operating proce-
dures resulted in leaks, spills, and
the dumping of oil and industrial
chemicals. When Union decided to
sell the property in 1980, it re-
moved some of the contaminated
soil but covered other contaminat-
ed areas with landscaping gravel.
When Gopher Oil Company
("Gopher") expressed an interest
in purchasing the site, Union rep-
resentatives told Gopher of two
previous chemical spills but did
not inform Gopher that past oper-
ating procedures caused continual
leaks and dumping on the site.
During the site inspection conduct-
ed by Gopher representatives,
some soil discoloration was visible,
but much of the contaminated
ground was hidden beneath the
gravel. Although Gopher had ac-
cess to Union's records, it did not
examine them.
The president of Gopher con-
tacted the Minnesota Department
of Inspections and the Minnesota
Pollution Control Authority ("the
Authority"). The Authority told
Gopher about the two major chem-
ical spills but had no information
about other pollution problems at
that site.
Gopher purchased the site from
Union in November, 1980. The
purchase agreement stated that the
land and facilities were transferred
in an "as is" condition and that
none of the warranties made in the
agreement misstated or omitted
any material facts. After the pur-
chase, Gopher repaired the plant
and claims to have controlled and
cleaned up any leaks or spills.
Three years after the purchase,
the Authority ordered an investiga-
tion, which revealed that the site
still contained substantial pollu-
tion. Under a compliance agree-
ment with the Authority, Gopher
spent $423,272.81 in cleanup
costs.
In January, 1988, Gopher sued
Union in the United States District
Court for the District of Minneso-
ta, seeking damages for fraud and
recovery of its cleanup costs under
the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42
U.S.C. 9607, 9613 (1992), and the
Minnesota Environmental Re-
sponse and Liability Act ("MER-
LA"), Minn. Stat. 115B.04,
115B.08 (1991).
Under CERCLA, a federal stat-
ute, the costs of cleaning up a
polluted site are allocated among
the responsible parties. If a party
pays more than its fair share, it can
sue other responsible parties for
the difference. CERCLA also au-
thorizes the award of attorney fees
to the winning party in such an
action. MERLA provides for es-
sentially the same actions under
Minnesota state law.
District Court Awards Full
Cleanup Costs
The jury found that Union had
made material misrepresentations
about the condition of the site in
order to induce Gopher to pur-
chase it. The jury also found Union
100 percent responsible for the
cleanup costs imposed under CER-
CLA. The district court awarded
Gopher the amount of its past
cleanup costs, plus interest and
more than $500,000 in attorney
fees.
Under Minnesota law, out-of-
pocket loss is the difference be-
tween the actual value of the prop-
erty Gopher received and the pur-
chase price Gopher paid for it, in
addition to any damages caused by
the fraud. The district court rea-
soned that the cleanup activities
would increase the value of the
property. Therefore, the district
court judge decided to determine
out-of-pocket damages by calculat-
ing the difference between the pur-
chase price and the value of the
property after the cleanup. The
judge decided to wait until the site
was cleaned and revalued before
determining Gopher's out-of-
pocket loss.
Union moved for a new trial
which the district court denied.
Union appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Eight Circuit both
the denial of a new trial as well as
the judgment imposing CERCLA
liability and the award of attorney
fees. Gopher appealed the district
court's decision to defer calcula-
tion of the damages under the
fraud claim until after completion
of the cleanup.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Occurred
Union argued that the "as is"
clause in the purchase agreement
and Gopher's experience in the
industry conferred upon Gopher a
duty to investigate the property
before purchasing it. Therefore,
Gopher's evidence of fraud, which
consisted of testimony that Union
had assured Gopher the site was
pollution free, was not substantial
enough to support the jury's ver-
dict. The appellate court upheld
the district court's decision be-
cause the evidence showed that
Union knew of the pollution and
had tried to conceal it from Go-
pher. Additionally, Gopher had
relied upon these misrepresenta-
tions when purchasing the proper-
ty.
With regard to the common law
fraud claim, Union argued that no
law allows for recovery of attorney
fees in this type of common law
action. The court of appeals
130 Volume 4 Number 4/Fall, 1992
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
agreed, stating that the fraud claim
was separate from the CERCLA
claim. The court therefore remand-
ed the attorney fee award for re-
duction by the amount appor-
tioned to the fraud claim.
Gopher appealed the district
court's deferral of the damages
award. Gopher argued that this
retention of jurisdiction was erro-
neous under Minnesota law and
also violated its Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial on the
issue of damages. The court of
appeals held that the district court
was correct in allowing out-of-
pocket damages. However, the cal-
culation of the damages should not
have been postponed until the
cleanup was substantially com-
plete. Instead, the award should
have been made promptly by using
expert testimony to estimate the
value of the property upon comple-
tion of cleanup.
Union Fully Responsible For
CERCLA Cleanup Costs
On the CERCLA claim, Union
contended that the "as is" clause of
the purchase agreement trans-
ferred liability for the cleanup
from Union to Gopher. Addition-
ally, Union argued that CERCLA
allows apportionment of liability
among all responsible parties,
therefore the apportionment of the
full cleanup liability to Union was
unfair.
The court of appeals upheld the
district court's decision, stating
that the allocation of liability un-
der CERCLA is an equitable deter-
mination made by the district
court's factual findings and legal
conclusions. The evidence showed
that Union knew of and was re-
sponsible for the extensive, toxic
pollution. In addition, the district
court had found that Gopher had
not materially contributed to the
pollution and had no knowledge of
the pollution until an investigation
was ordered by the Authority. The
appellate court held that because
Gopher was fraudulently induced
into entering into the purchase
agreement, the "as is" clause was
invalid and did not serve to trans-
fer liability to Gopher.
The court of appeals also dis-
agreed with Union's contention
that Gopher should not have re-
covered attorney fees for the CER-
CLA claim. Quoting the statutory
language in both CERCLA and
MERLA that expressly allows the
awarding of attorney fees to the
prevailing party, the court of ap-
peals found the district court's
decision appropriate to the extent
that the attorney fees awarded to
Gopher were applied to the CER-
CLA claim and not to the fraud
claim.
Monica A. Murray
Eleventh Circuit Finds
That All Relevant
Circumstances Must Be
Considered Before
Voiding A Foreclosure
Sale
In Grissom v. Johnson, 955 F.2d
1440 (11 th Cir. 1992), the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that before a
court can revoke a residential fore-
closure sale, it must be persuaded
that the foreclosure sale price was
not the reasonably equivalent val-
ue of the property. However, in
this case, the record lacked specific
facts regarding the circumstances
of the foreclosure sale, so the court
of appeals remanded the case back
to the lower court.
Background
In 1971, Johnny Grissom
("Grissom") took out an $18,000
home loan from Citizens and
Southern National Bank ("C&S")
and secured the loan with his resi-
dence. Subsequently, Grissom de-
faulted. After C&S notified Gris-
som about the bank's intention to
foreclose on his home, the bank
advertised the foreclosure sale
once a week for four weeks. On
April 4, 1989, the property was
sold to Birnet Johnson ("John-
son") for $14,059, the amount
Grissom owed on the note to C&S.
One day after this sale, Grissom
and his wife filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy protection. One month
later, they filed a complaint in the
United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Geor-
gia seeking to revoke the foreclo-
sure sale.
Lower Courts Void
Foreclosure Sale
In bankruptcy court, Grissom
argued that under federal bank-
ruptcy law, the foreclosure sale
should be nullified. The court
agreed and found that the only
substantial question was whether
the sale price of $14,059 was a
reasonably equivalent value of the
Grissom residence. The court re-
lied upon the "Durrett 70% Rule",
set forth by a prior Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in Dur-
rett v. Washington National Insur-
ance Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1980), which established that in
order to meet the reasonable
equivalency standard, a property
must be sold during a foreclosure
sale for at least 70 percent of its
actual market price.
The bankruptcy court found
that the sale price was less than
$26,000, 70 percent of the proper-
ty's market value. Since the sale
did not meet the Durrett Rule, the
bankruptcy court ruled that the
foreclosure sale was void. C&S
appealed this decision to the Unit-
ed States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia.
The district court also relied
upon the Durrett dictum and af-
firmed the order of the bankruptcy
court. The district court mechani-
cally analyzed the issue of reason-
ably equivalent value and held that
the bankruptcy court correctly fol-
lowed the general rule that a sale
for less than 70 percent of the fair
market value is less than a reason-
ably equivalent value. C&S ap-
pealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.
Eleventh Circuit Reverses, Using
Totality of Circumstances Rule
On appeal, C&S argued that
both the bankruptcy court and
district court relied too heavily on
the Durrett test while ignoring oth-
er potentially relevant factors. The
Eleventh Circuit agreed and reject-
ed the lower courts' dependence on
the Durrett test. In doing so, the
court relied on its recent decision
that a determination of reasonable
equivalency requires a consider-
ation and analysis of the totality of
the circumstances surrounding a(continued on page 132)
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